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THEM O D E R N  L A W  of obscenity drew its first legal 
breath in 1949-twenty-one years ago. In that year Judge Curtis Bok 
decided Commonwealth v. Gordon, et aL,l which held that a num- 
ber of “sexy” books * were entitled to protection under the free speech 
and press provisions of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to 
the United States Constitution. After holding that a book dealing with 
sex cannot be condemned as obscene unless it presented a clear and 
present danger of serious social ham,  Judge Bok went on to note 
that a book, however sexually impure and pornographic “cannot be 
a present danger unless its reader closes it, lays its aside, and trans- 
mutes its erotic allurement into overt action.”l He also expressed 
doubt that anti-social action follows the reading of an obscene book. 
Earlier cases such as United States v. One Book Called “Ulysses’’a 
were decided without reference to the constitutional guarantees 
secured by the First Amendment. 
Seven years later in United States v. Roth (1956) the late Judge 
Jerome Frank expanded Judge Bok‘s First Amendment arguments4 
In doing so he paid his respects to Judge Bok, stating that before 
reading Judge Bok’s opinion he “had little doubt about the validity 
of a purely punitive obscenity statute. But the next year , . . Judge 
Curtis Bok, one of America’s most reflective judges, directly attacked 
the validity of any such punitive legislation. His brilliant opinion, 
which states arguments that (so far as I know) have never been 
answered, nudged me into the skeptical views contained in this 
opinion.” 
Judge Frank invited the Supreme Court to re-examine the whole 
obscenity question in light of the expanding freedom afforded speech 
in other areas. “I think it is not improper to set forth,” he said, “con- 
siderations concerning the obscenity statute’s validity with which, up 
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to now, I think the Supreme Court has not dealt in any of its opin- 
ions. I do not suggest the inevitability of the conclusion that the ob- 
scenity statute is unconstitutional, I do suggest that it is hard to 
avoid that conclusion, if one applies to that legislation the reasoning 
the Supreme Court has applied to other sources of legislation. Perhaps 
I have overlooked conceivable compelling contrary arguments. If so, 
maybe my opinion will evoke them.” 
In 1957, the Supreme Court accepted Judge Frank’s invitation. The 
result was the now famous Roth-Alberts opinionn6 Unfortunately, the 
Supreme Court failed to answer the basic question raised by Judge 
Frank. Instead, the Court lightly brushed aside his suggestion that 
the obscenity laws invaded the free speech provision of the Con- 
stitution, saying merely that “obscenity” was not within the area of 
constitutionally protected speech because it was utterly without re- 
deeming social importance. 
In the thirteen years since Roth was decided, the Supreme Court 
has written hundreds of thousands of words attempting to draw the 
line separating constitutionally protected speech from criminally ob- 
scene speech. Before a work can be condemned under the Roth stand-
ards it must ( 1 )  go substantially beyond customary limits of candor 
in the description or representation of matters pertaining to sex, nudity 
or excretion, and ( 2 )  appeal to the prurient interests of the average 
person, and (3 )  be utterly without redeeming social importance. 
The vagueness of the standards and the difficulty of applying them 
to particular material were revealed by Justice Stewart, who said in 
Jacobellisv. Ohio: 
It is possible to read the Court’s opinion in Roth v. United States 
in a variety of ways. In saying this, I imply no criticism of the 
Court, which in those cases was faced with the task of trying to 
define what may be indefinable. I have reached the conclusion . . . 
that under the First Amendment criminal laws in this area are 
constitutionally limited to hard-core pornography. I shall not today 
attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be 
embraced within that shorthand description; and perhaps I could 
never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see 
it, and the material involved in this case is not that.‘ 
In 1967, in the Redrup-Austin cases, the Supreme Court shifted its 
focus, In holding that the lower court finding of obscenity could not 
stand under any constitutional test of obscenity, the Court added the 
following significant statement: 
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In none of the cases was there a claim that the statute in ques- 
tion reflected a specific and limited state concern for juveniles. In 
none was there any suggestion of an assault upon individual pri- 
vacy by publication in a manner so obtrusive as to make it impos-
sible for an unwilling individual to avoid exposure to it. And in 
none was there evidence of the sort of “pandering” which the Court 
found significant in Ginzburg v. United States.8 * 
The Redrup case pointed in the direction of freedom for adults to 
receive or purchase discreetly any material dealing with sex or nudity 
that appealed to them. While some lower courts followed this direc-
tioq9 the majority failed to do so.1o 
By 1968, Judge Harlan, in Ginsberg v. New York, acknowledged 
that the obscenity law was a constitutional disaster area, observing 
that it “has produced a variety of views among the members of the 
Court unmatched in any other course of constitutional adjudication.” 
Members of the Court, he said, disagreed among themselves on vir- 
tually every aspect of the law. “The upshot of all this divergence in 
viewpoint is that anyone who undertakes to examine the Court’s de-
cisions since Roth which have held particular material obscene or not 
obscene would find himself in utter bewilderment. From the stand- 
point of the Court itself the current approach has required us to spend 
an inordinate amount of time in the absurd business of perusing and 
viewing the miserable stuff that pours into the Court.”11 
It was against this background that the Supreme Court decided 
Stanley v. GeorginI2 in April of 1969, and withdrew from its earlier 
holding that obscenity was not protected by the First Amendment. 
The Court there appeared to embrace much, if not all, of the under- 
lying philosophy of Judges Bok and Frank. 
In Stanleg v. Georgia police officers found some reels of obscene 
films while executing a search warrant in the home of Robert Stanley. 
The films were seized and Stanley was prosecuted and found guilty 
‘In Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966), Justice Stewart tried his 
hand at defining hard core pornography. He said: 
Such materials include photographs, both still and motion picture, with no pre- 
tense of artistic value, graphically depicting acts of sexual intercourse, including 
various acts of sodomy and sadism, and sometimes involvin several participants 
in scenes of orgy-like character. They also include strips o f  drawings in comic- 
book format grossly depicting similar activities in an exaggerated fashion. There 
are, in addition, pamphlets and booklets, sometimes with photographic illustra- 
tions, verbally describing such activities in a bizarre manner with no attempt 
whatsoever to afford portrayals of character or situation and with no pretense to 
literary value. All of this material . . . cannot conceivably be characterized as 
embodying communication of ideas or artistic values inviolate under the First 
Amendment. 
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of possessing obscene matter, The Supreme Court reversed, holding 
that private possession of such matter cannot constitutionally be made 
a crime in light of the free speech and press provisions of the Constitu- 
tion. The Georgia authorities argued that since “obscenity” was not 
within the area of constitutionally protected speech, it followed that 
Georgia was free to deal with the possession of such material in the 
same manner as it dealt with other contraband found in the possession 
of its citizens. Georgia argued that no constitutional provision was 
violated by a state criminal law which made the possession of “ob- 
scene” matter a crime. Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, dis- 
agreed, stating that the mere private possession of obscene material 
is protected by the First Amendment, supplemented by a right of 
privacy. A fundamental purpose of the free speech provisions, he 
stated, is the guarantee of “the right to receive information and ideas, 
regardless of their social worth.” This right to receive, he continued, 
“takes on an added dimension” when joined with the “right to be free 
. . . from unwarranted governmental intrusion into one’s privacy.” 
In the Stanley case, the Supreme Court finally got around to ex- 
amining the purpose behind obscenity legislation, as Judge Frank had 
urged them to do some thirteen years earlier. Thus, when Georgia 
argued that obscenity legislation is necessary to protect the moral 
health of the community and to prevent harmful conduct that may 
be incited by contact with obscenity, the Court rejected the argu- 
ments. 
As to protecting the “moral health” of the community the Court 
said: 
Georgia asserts the right to protect the individual’s mind from 
the effects of obscenity. We are not certain that this argument 
amounts to anything more than the assertion that the State has the 
right to control the moral content of a person’s thoughts. To some, 
this may be a noble purpose, but it is wholly inconsistent with the 
philosophy of the First Amendment. . . . Nor is it relevant that ob- 
scenity in general, or the particular films before the Court, are 
arguably devoid of any ideological content. The line between the 
transmission of ideas and mere entertainment is much too elusive 
for this Court to draw, if indeed such a line can be drawn at all.12 
Rejecting the “incitement” to anti-social behavior argument the 
Court stated: 
Georgia asserts that exposure to obscenity may lead to deviant 
sexual behavior or crimes of sexual violence. There appears to be 
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little empirical basis for that assertion. But more importantly, if the 
State is only concerned about literature inducing anti-social con- 
duct, we believe that in the context of private consumption of ideas 
and information we should adhere to the view that “( a)mong free 
men, the deterrents ordinarily to be applied to prevent crime are 
education and punishment for violations of the law.” l2 
The Stanley case appears to hold that obscenity laws remain viable 
only with respect to public distribution of obscene materials where 
the State can establish justification for intervention, as in the case of 
dissemination to minors or unwarranted intrusion on the privacy or 
sensibilities of the public. 
Recognition of the significant impact of the Stanley v. Georgia de-
cision has already come from lower courts. In Stein v. Bachelor, a 
federal court declared the Texas obscenity statute unconstitutional, 
giving a generous reading to the Stanley case. Aware that in a nar- 
row sense the Stanley case merely held that the free speech provisions 
of the Constitution prohibit making private possession of obscene 
material a crime, the court found it impossible “to ignore the broader 
implication of the opinion which appears to reject or significantly 
modify the proposition stated in Roth v. United States, that obscenity 
is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press.” l3 
The Stein court interpreted Stanley as modifying “the dichotomy be- 
tween protected and unprotected expression by recognizing that at 
least in some contexts obscenity is afforded First Amendment protec- 
tion and thus cannot constitutionally be regulated in the absence of 
a legitimate societal interest.” l3 
In United States v. Thirty-Seven (37) Photographs, another federal 
court declared the hundred year-old customs law unconstitutional. 
In that case a citizen returning from Europe had thirty-seven allegedly 
obscene photographs seized from his luggage by a customs inspector. 
In the lawsuit that followed, the court, without deciding how far 
Stanley goes, invalidated the customs law because it prohibited an 
adult from importing an obscene work for private use. The court 
then went on to say that “the First Amendment cannot be construed 
to permit those who have funds for foreign travel to bring back con- 
stitutionally protected literature while prohibiting its access by the 
less affluent.” l4 
Finally in Karalexis v. Byrne, a third federal court took Stanley to 
its logical conclusion. The court there held the Massachusetts ob- 
scenity statute unconstitutional because it was not limited to protect- 
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ing youth or the privacy of the general public. After reviewing the 
Stanley case the court said in Karalexis v. Byrne:  “The question is, how 
far does Stanley go. Is the decision to be limited to the precise prob- 
lem of ‘a mere private possession of obscene material’; is it the high 
water mark of a past flood, or is it the precursor of a new one.”15 
Believing that Stanley is the beginning of a new era, the court held 
that to justify any obscenity law the proponents of the law must prove 
affirmatively that obscenity raises a “clear and present danger of anti- 
social conduct or will probably induce its recipients to such conduct.” 
The Karalexis court then went on to say that the Stanley court had 
concluded that obscenity presented no such danger to the adult viewer 
or to the public as a result of the adults’ exposure. 
In recognition of the expanded meaning, the Karalexis court gave 
the Stanley opinion, the court delayed giving effect to its judgment to 
permit the Supreme Court to review the case if it chose to do so. The 
Supreme Court accepted the invitation and stayed the order of the 
lower court. 
I t  now appears that the three cases which have given Stanley v. 
Georgia a broad reading will be reviewed by the United States Su-
preme Court. No one but a clairvoyant or a fool would confidently 
predict the outcome of these cases in a court which has a new Chief 
Justice and is rapidly changing its character. Indeed, as I am writing 
this article, the Wall Street Journal announces that “the Supreme 
Court is about to wrestle once more with obscenity.” Observing that 
Chief Justice Burger has already “made clear his position advocating 
stricter local controls over fleshy movies and sexy printed materials” l 6  
and that President Nixon shares these views, the Wall Street Journal 
predicted a conservative turn. 
For the moment one can say no more than the Karalexis court said: 
We confess that no oracle speaks to Karalexis unambiguously. None- 
theless, we think it probable that Both remains intact only with 
respect to public distribution in the full sense, and that restricted 
distribution, adequately controlled, is no longer to be condemned. 
It is difficult to think that if Stanley has a constitutional right to 
view obscene films, the Court would intend its exercise to be only 
at the expense of a criminal act on behalf of the only logical source, 
the professional supplier. A constitutional right to receive a com- 
munication would seem meaningless if there were no coextensive 
right to make it. If a rich Stanley can view a film, or read a book, 
in his home, a poorer Stanley should be free to visit a protected 
theatre or library. We see no reason for saying he must go a10ne.l~ 
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